High Court orders a new hearing before a new judge in new year

 Below are key extracts from barrister submissions ending with an order given yesterday for a new hearing before a new judge.

Extract from John Hunter Skeleton Argument on behalf of the Stop the Tesco Toxic Towers Community Group dated 12th December 2022

Ground 2: The Council failed properly to apply policy SI1 and failed to take into

account mandatory relevant considerations, which was a material error

9. This Ground is still pursued on the basis that, even if the PO did not

misunderstand or misled the Committee in relation to policy SI.1, D

nevertheless still erred by failing to take into account considerations which it

was explicitly or implicitly required to take into account by the policy, or which

were so obviously material that it was irrational for it not to take into account

(cf. R (Samuel Smith Old Brewery (Tadcaster)) v North Yorks CC [2020] PTSR

221 per Lord Carnwath JSC at [29-32]). In particular:

(a) As noted above, it is clear on the basis of the IP’s own AQA that the levels

of PM in the vicinity of the site already substantially exceed the WHO

targets (and will continue to exceed them in the modelled future assessment

years) and hence meet the definition of “existing poor air quality” given in

the London Plan;

(b) Policy SI.1 B2(b) required D to consider how “increased exposure” to the

“existing poor air quality” would be prevented or minimised;

1 The current WHO targets (2021) are 15 µg/m3 (annual) and 5 µg/m3 (24 hour) for

PM10 and 5 µg/m3 (annual) and 15 µg/m3 (24 hour) for PM 2.5 [SB1/B376], cf. the

existing background levels and modelled future levels set out in the ES [SB1/B184-

185, B217-223].

4

(c) Furthermore, given that the development is intended to be used by large

numbers of people particularly vulnerable to poor air quality, including

children attending the proposed three form entry primary school, SI.1 B2(d)

specifically required the IP to demonstrate that all reasonable measures had

been employed to minimise their exposure;

(d) However, neither D or the IP’s ES/AQA recognised that this would be the

effect of the development. Nor did either give any (or any adequate)

consideration to whether adequate design measures had been secured to

minimise the exposure of children attending the school. In particular, whilst

a condition (condition 61) was imposed requiring the use of mechanical

ventilation/filtration in parts of the residential development which would

be most exposed to airborne pollutants, no equivalent measures were

required or even considered in the case of the school. ENDs

 

This is  an extract below from the skeleton argument from Ms COLQUHOUN on behalf of Weston Homes on the 13th December 2022

1.     These updated submissions on behalf of Weston Homes (‘IP’) follow the provision by the Claimant (‘C’) of a Supplementary Skeleton dated 12 December 2022 (‘Supp Skel C’)  and purport to “clarify which grounds/arguments are still pursued and to provide a brief response to the skeleton arguments submitted on behalf of D and the IP”.(Supp Skel [1].

 2.     The IP notes that all the C’s original Grounds are said to be maintained nevertheless the IP draws attention to areas where it appears that the C has changed his position and the implication thereof.

 3.     Before doing, given how central the interpretation of London Plan 2021 Policy SI 1 is to his claim the IP draws  attention to the Mayor of London’s (MOL) own consideration to the very issues that the C raises in respect of the proposed Primary School and Air Quality in the Stage 2 referral dated 7 March 2022 (‘MOL Stage 2’) (CB/A516). Particular attention is drawn to MOL Stage 2 [40-44] (CB/A523) and [80-86].

 4.     The MOL clearly concludes in short that the IP’s “Air Quality Assessment…and Air Quality Neutral Assessment have been independently assessed and it is agreed that this demonstrates that the proposal are air quality neutral” MOL Stage 2 [84]. The referral then considers the IP’s air quality evidence against London Plan Policy SI1 B (2)(b) and (d) and in particular the position of the Primary School as well as the C’s specific objections. The MOL confirms in terms that “the scheme would not result in unacceptable air quality impacts and is in accordance with London Plan Policy S1”.

 5.     The C’s position therefore  in respect of the allegations of misinterpretation of  Policy SI 1 and its application by the D which is supported by the MOL as above is therefore untenable.

Grounds 1 and 2

6.     The IP notes that the C appears now to accept that the scheme is Air Quality Neutral but that the other limbs of SI 1 have in effect been ignored by the D in reaching its conclusions about the scheme.

 

7.     As set out above there is clearly nothing to these submissions when the evidence is properly understood and a fair reading given to the D’s Officer’s Reports and the to the MOL Stage 2 referral and approval of the scheme.

 

8.     It is noted that the C at Supp Skel [10] asserts that the “other arguments set out in §§60-62 of the original skeleton argument are not pursued” in light it appears of the submissions at Supp Skel [9] it is however not entirely clear what this means in light of the C’s maintenance of both Grounds 1 and 2."

 ENDs Exrract

Following the hearing of the 16th December. The judge invited the barristers to suggest a way forward. John Hunter on 19th December suggested a new hearing with a new judge per the below in 5 paragraphs:

 1.     These submissions are made in response to the Judge’s request for representations on how the Court should proceed in light of the IP drawing to the Court’s attention that the MoL’s Stage 2 letter post-dated the decision to grant planning permission by nearly a year, and therefore could not have been taken into account by the planning officer or the planning committee before the decision was made, as the Judge had assumed when giving judgment.   

 2.     It is well-established that a judge has power to re-open and alter a judgment at any point until it is entered/perfected (Re Barrell Enterprises [1973] 1 WLR 19; Stewart v Engel [2000] 1 WLR 2268 (CA)). The exercise of the power is not limited to “exceptional circumstances” (Re L-B (Children) (Preliminary Finding: Power to Reverse) [2013] 1 WLR 634 (SC)), although the  factors favouring re-opening the order must be “sufficient to overcome the deadweight of the finality principle on the other side of the scales, together with any other factors pointing towards leaving the original order in place” (AIC Ltd v Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [2022] 1 WLR 3223 (SC) at [39]). In general, “if a judgment contains what the judge acknowledges is an error when it is pointed out, the judgment should be corrected, unless there is some very good reason for not doing so. A judgment should be an accurate record of the judge’s findings and of the reasons for the decision. It should not normally be necessary for a party to bring an appeal to correct an error, if it turns out that the parties and the judge agree that there is an error and that a correction should be made” (Space Airconditioning plc v Guy [2013] 1 WLR 1293 at [53] per Mummery LJ).

 3.     The four options identified by the Judge were:

 

(1)   Do nothing.

(2)   The error is corrected in a written judgment.

(3)   A rehearing before the Judge.

(4)   A rehearing before a different judge.

 

4.     C’s preferred option is option 4. Options 1 and 2 would be clearly inappropriate. The Judge’s mistaken belief formed a material part of his reasons for refusing permission and it is not clear that the same decision would have been reached, particularly in relation to Ground 2, if he had appreciated the true position. Therefore, it is necessary for the parties to have the opportunity to make further submissions and for the matter be considered afresh on the correct factual basis. In C’s view, it would be preferable for this to be before another judge in order to avoid any perception of possible predetermination.

 5.     It is understood that D and the IP agree that the application should be redetermined (at least in relation to grounds 1, 2 and 4) but consider that this should be done as a paper exercise. C disagrees. It is important that C has a full opportunity to present his case and for the judge to be able to ask questions of advocates and test their arguments. END OF SUBMISSION

 The below is the 34 paragraph submission from Weston, supported by Redbridge, saying no need for a new hearing before a new judge.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE                                                       CO/2471/2022

KINGS BENCH DIVISION                                                                                                                

PLANNING COURT

IN THE MATTER OF an application for permission for judicial review

 

B E T W E E N:-

R (On the application of MR ANDREW WALKER)

Claimant

- and

LONDON BOROUGH OF REDBRIDGE

Defendant

- and

(1) WESTON HOMES PLC

(2) MAYOR OF LONDON

Interested Parties

__________________________________________________________________

 

RENEWAL APPLICATION : SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF

THE FIRST INTERESTED PARTY FOLLOWING JUDGMENT AND PRIOR TO ORDER

___________________________________________________________________

 

 

1.     These submissions relate to the issue which has arisen as a consequence of the learned Judge’s understanding that the Mayor of London’s Stage 2 Referral (which is  dated 7 March 2022) (‘the MOL Stage 2’ )(CB/A516) had in fact been made prior to the Council’s officer’s report (‘the OR’) and the Planning Committee’s resolution to grant (on 27  May 2021) and therefore would have been available for both the officer and the committee to consider at that point. In his ex tempore judgment on 16 December 2022, the learned Judge  is understood  to have used this understanding for his view that the MOL Stage 2 would have been relevant to what was set out in the OR and to the committee’s resolution.

 

2.     In its duty to the Court, the IP identified this as being factually incorrect.

 

3.     The Judge has asked the parties to consider and agree upon the best way forward to recommend to the Court. The options identified by the learned Judge are:

 

(i)    The Claimant (‘C’) accepts the decision of the Court to dismiss the claim as unarguable as originally given because some of the reasons which the judge found were unarguable are not affected by this point. Moreover, the C may take the view that it is not relevant in any event to any of the grounds and does not wish to take issue with the point;

 

(ii)  The Order is perfected/issued without this point addressed and the decision rests. This would still permit C to pursue the case in the Court of Appeal, should he wish, to argue a procedural issue (although the judge noted that this would be highly unsatisfactory given the point has been raised before the formal Order has been perfected and handed down);

 

(iii)         The learned Judge be invited to consider the position further in light of this matter and hand down his decision at a later date; or 

 

(iv)  The learned Judge be asked to order that the matter is re-heard again in front of a different judge.

 

4.     The IP sets out below its submissions on the implication of the above in respect of the learned Judge’s ex tempore conclusions that all of the C’s 4 grounds were unarguable and why it considers, in light of all the circumstances of the case and to meet the overriding objective, that option (iii) is the appropriate way forward.

 

C’s case

 

5.     The C’s claim has changed or been refined from that originally set out in his SFG in respect of Grounds 1 and 2 (which argued in particular that the IP needed to show an improvement in air quality would arise).

 

6.     C’s case is now that the OR misinterpreted London Plan policy SI1 (CB/A141) by suggesting that in order to comply with it and address the criteria or requirements of B(1)[1] the IP need ‘only’ show that it meets one of the minimum criteria or requirement of B(2), namely B(2)(a)” development proposals must be at least Air Quality Neutral” whereas (in particular) B(2) (b) requires “development proposals should use design solutions to prevent or minimise increased exposure to existing air pollution and make provision to address local problems of air quality in preference to post-design or retro-fitted mitigation measures” and B(2)(d) requires “ development proposals…that are likely to be used by large numbers of people particularly vulnerable to poor air quality, such as children or older people should demonstrate that design measures have been used to minimise exposure”.

 

7.     The C argues in short that the way the OR should be read is that the officer wrongly advised the committee that SI1 was complied with without any consideration of any of the other parts of the SI1 policy than the AQN criterion at B(2)(a).

 

8.     The C also argues under Grounds 1 and 2  that the officer had a duty which he failed to discharge applying R (Lowther) v Durham CC [2001] EWCA Civ 781 “to provide sufficient information and guidance to enable the members to reach a decision applying the relevant statutory criteria”. This is said to arise because the OR does not “explain how the development accorded with the requirements in SI1 B2(b) and (d) to prevent/minimise "increased exposure to existing air pollution", especially in the case of "large numbers of people particularly vulnerable to poor air quality, such as children or older people" (see C’s Supplementary Skeleton [8])

 

9.     The above appears to be the nub of the C’s claim under these grounds together with the suggestion that there was no evidence of any or any ‘adequate’ design solutions as part of the school’s design to address the increased exposure of the children to  existing poor air quality. The ‘existing poor air quality’ , by reference to the definition in LP 2021 para 9.14 (CB/A143), is said to arise as a result of evidence of existing breaches of the WHO guideline for PM2.5 (5 micrograms/m3) and not by reference to the ‘legal’ objective limits in the AQSR which it is accepted are not breached.

 

10.  The C points to the fact that a condition (61) (CB/A089) was imposed upon the final planning permission which required the use of mechanical ventilation/filtration in parts of the residential development (below the 7th floor) which will face the roads around the development to the south, north and east “to ensure the development meets local, regional and national air quality objectives, and in accordance with Policy LP24..and Policy SI1…”. There is no specific equivalent condition[2] imposed in respect of the school and the C suggests that this means the D failed to recognise that the school would be in an existing area of poor air quality and that the IP needed to show the design of the school included measures which would prevent/minimise "increased exposure to existing air pollution".

 

11.  The C’s Ground 3 relates to the way the cumulative impact assessment was carried out but which, it is submitted, is not affected by the issues raised in Grounds 1 and 2.

 

12.  C’s Ground 4 relates to compliance with the PSED and is to some extent parasitic on Grounds 1 and 2 because it relates to taking the needs of children and those with asthma who will be affected by air quality issues into account.

Relevance of MOL Stage 2 report

13.  The resolution to grant of 27 May 2021 makes it clear that it was subject to a number of matters including the necessary legal stage[3] of an MoL Stage 2 referral : ( CB/ A 456)

“(i)..amendments which appropriate [sic] in the addendum report; and

(ii) The Head of Planning and Building Control be authorised to GRANT PLANNING PERMISSION  subject to

(a) a direction from the Mayor of London or the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

(b) conditions set out below

(c) The satisfactory completion of a legal agreement under Section 106….”

 

14.  The IP drew attention to the way that the Mayor in the MoL Stage 2 report addressed policy SI1 in its SGR [fn1][10] and[96.] and in its Skeleton at [fn1] and [29] and in Updated Skel at [3][4] and [7].

 

15.  The MOL Stage 2 report is part of the legal requirements for the form of proposal that was before the Council and must be taken into account by the Council in reaching its final decision.

 

16.  The IP submitted that the interpretation of London Plan SI1 and the evidence before the Council  was relevant to the issues raised in C’s Ground 1 and 2 .

 

17.  This is because the MoL would have had the same evidence before it as the Council’s committee did at the time of resolution (including the committee resolution, the OR and updated report) and carries out the same exercise as the Council but in particular by reference to SI1.

 

18.  The Council’s decision which was delegated to the relevant officer was made on 30 May 2022, almost a year after the resolution to grant. That is the decision which is the subject of challenge not the resolution to grant and was based upon all the relevant considerations at that point including the MOL Stage 2 report.

 

19.  The IP drew specific attention to certain passages in the MoL Stage 2 report namely

 [40-44] (CB/A523) and [80-86](CB/A529 -530).

 

20.  The MOL clearly concludes in short that the IP’s “Air Quality Assessment…and Air Quality Neutral Assessment have been independently assessed and it is agreed that this demonstrates that the proposals are air quality neutral” MOL Stage 2 [84]. The referral then considers the IP’s air quality evidence against London Plan Policy SI1. With regard to B (2)(b) and (d) it states (albeit without specific reference to those criteria) “London Plan Policy SI1 states that development proposals in Air Quality Focus Areas (AQFA) or that are likely to be used by large numbers of people particularly vulnerable to poor air quality, such  as children, should demonstrate that design measures have been used to minimise exposure. The site is not within or adjoining an AQFA; however, the school has been designed to minimise exposure, with the main entrance and all external play space to the rear of the building, away from the High Road. Furthermore, the Air Quality Assessment finds no predicted exceedances of national air quality objectives in all modelled scenarios at all on-site receptors, including the proposed primary school.”

 

21.  The learned Judge concluded that in light of the above and on the understanding that MOL Stage 2 was available at the point of resolution to grant that it would in effect be understandable why it might not be necessary for the OR to address SI1 in the same way, even if the C was correct to suggest that there was any gap in the OR’s treatment of SI1.

 

22.  It is this finding which gives rise to the issue to be addressed.

IP’s Submissions on implications

23.  The IP submits :

 

(i)             that read fairly there is no gap in the OR or in the officer’s advice to the committee at resolution to grant stage in respect of SI1 and in particular that the OR did not advise that the development is AQN is the only SI1 criteria to meet;

(ii)           that there was sufficient evidence available to the Council and committee at the time that addressed the design measures attributable to the school and air quality in particular including achieving air quality positivity;

(iii)         that the delegated officer, in reaching the  final decision whether to grant permission, would have had to have regard to the MOL Stage 2 in any event and would have been left in no doubt about compliance with SI1 which was, importantly, from the point of view of the authority which is responsible for the adoption and ensuring the implementation/application of policy SI1 to development in London;

(iv)          the MOL Stage 2 report was in line with the resolution to grant.

 

24.  To that end, whilst the MOL Stage 2 would not have been relevant to the OR and the planning committee’s resolution, it would have been materially relevant to the Council’s final decision.

 

25.  Taking the C’s claim at its highest therefore, if there was any ‘gap’ or absence of clarity as to the extent of what compliance with SI1 and in particular B(2)(b) and (d) needed in this case, the Council’s decision would have had to have taken into account the way that  the MOL Stage 2 addressed the policy  and the design features of the school which in the MOL’s view achieved compliance as well.

 

26.  For the avoidance of doubt, the C has not submitted to date that the MOL Stage 2 is either wrong  or misinterprets SI1 and misapplies it against the evidence. The focus of the C’s claim is therefore only upon the OR and the resolution to grant, it is nevertheless the Council’s final decision which is the subject of the challenge and that was taken, inter alia, in light of the MOL Stage 2 . To that end the decision is clearly unimpeachable.

 

27.  Overall, the IP submits that the issue of when the MOL Stage 2 was available to the Council as part of its decision making does not affect the lawfulness of the decision or the (un)arguability of C’s grounds 1 and 2 as well as ground 4.

 

28.  It is not relevant to Ground 3 in any event.

The Options

29.  At the time of writing the IP does not know what C’s confirmed stance is .

 

30.  The IP considers that option (ii) i.e allowing the decision to rest and the order made without addressing the point would be not be appropriate, in light of the overriding objective, even if the C were for some reason to agree to it. It would leave the matter unclear and undetermined and potentially prejudice all parties.

 

31.  The IP considers that option (iv) is not justified, most especially as the learned Judge has had to prepare for and has heard full argument.

 

32.  The IP does however consider that option (iii) provides the most appropriate solution i.e. to invite the learned Judge to reconsider the position and issue his judgment in writing at a later date, or to clarify his judgment by an addendum judgment in open court.

 

33.  The IP suggests that in the event that option (iii) is decided upon that the learned Judge direct that the parties provide any written submissions which address the implications of the issue on the claim and the defence but that this be limited to grounds (1) (2) and (4).

 

34.  The IP does not consider that further oral submissions need to be made nevertheless if the learned Judge disagrees that the matter can be dealt with in writing, the IP would suggest that a further hearing before the judge would be appropriate (as opposed to a new judge). In that event the IP submits that this again be on a limited basis (ie on grounds 1 ,2 and 4) reflecting the suggested written submissions (‘option (iii) B’).

 

PETER VILLAGE KC

CELINA COLQUHOUN

 

39 ESSEX CHAMBERS

18 DECEMBER 2022

 

The below is the order from the Judge of 21st December ordering a new hearing before a new judge:

COATARMSIn the High Court of Justice                                  CO/2471/2022

Queen’s Bench Division                                     

Planning Court

 

In the matter of an application for judicial review

 

 

THE KING

 

on the application of   

 

ANDREW JOHN WALKER

Claimant

-and-

 

REDBRIDGE LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL

Defendant

 

                      and

 

                             WESTON HOMES LIMITED                                                Interested Party

 

On an application by the Claimant for permission to adduce additional evidence and for disclosure

 

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant, the Defendant and Interested Party

 

ORDER by the Honourable Mr Justice Holgate

 

(1)    The renewed application to apply for judicial review in respect of grounds 1 and 3 is refused.

(2)    The renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review in respect of grounds 2 and 4 is adjourned to be heard by a different judge at an oral hearing with a time estimate of no more than 2 hours to include time for judgment.

(3)    If the claimant wishes to argue a point which is not already pleaded, an amended statement of facts and grounds must be filed and served by no later than 6 January 2023. Otherwise a point which has not been pleaded may not be argued at the adjourned hearing.

(4)    By no later than 10 January 2023 the Clamant must file and serve agreed paper and electronic hearing bundles containing only essential pages which are to be referred to in any party’s skeleton or oral submissions.

(5)    The claimant must file and serve a single, updated skeleton, replacing earlier skeletons, by no later than 12 January 2023.

(6)    The defendant and interested party must each file a single, updated skeleton, replacing earlier skeletons, by no later than 16 January 2023.

(7)    An agreed bundle of authorities must be filed by no later than 18 January 2023.

(8)    The adjourned hearing will be listed as soon as practicable after 18 January 2023 giving priority to judicial availability.

 

 

Reasons

 

1.                   At the conclusion of the hearing counsel for the IP rightly pointed out that in refusing permission to apply for JR I had relied upon a document which post-dated the consideration of the application by the committee and should not have been used to support the analysis in the officer’s report or the committee’s resolution. It was unfortunate that this document had been relied upon significantly in a skeleton for the hearing. It was also unfortunate that the error was not pointed out by any party during oral submissions despite the questions posed by the court to the effect that this material could, for example, have been taken int account in the preparation of the officer’s report.

2.                   The claimant accepts that this error did not affect the decision to refuse permission on grounds 1 and 3 and that permission should be refused accordingly. I so order. However, I agree with the claimant that in the interests of justice it is appropriate for the issue of permission on grounds 2 and 4 to be redetermined by another judge, notwithstanding the objections to that course of the other parties.

 

 

Signed          Sir David Holgate                               Dated  21 December 2022

 

 

 

 

 

The date of service of this order is calculated from the date in the section below

 

 

 

For completion by the Administrative Court Office

 

Sent / Handed to

 

either the Claimant, and the Defendant [and the Interested Party]

or the Claimant's, and the Defendant’s [and the Interested Party’s] solicitors

 

 

Date:

                     

 

                      Solicitors:

              Ref No. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



[1]1) Development proposals should not:

a) lead to further deterioration of existing poor air quality

b) create any new areas that exceed air quality limits, or delay the date at which compliance will be achieved in areas that are currently in exceedance of legal limits

c) create unacceptable risk of high levels of exposure to poor air quality”

[2] But see condition 57 (A088)(which requires details of ventilation/filtration/extraction details in respect of the school to be submitted and approved prior to occupation for amenity reasons and comply in part with LP24) and condition 82 which requires an Air Quality Positive Statement prior to commencement of each phase with measures to improve local air quality to comply with LP24 and SI1 (A094).

[3] in accordance with the Town and Country Planning (Mayor of London) Order 2008/580

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